

## Outline for Back Brief

- Opening Remarks - MGTaluto
- Purpose
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- ISF and Transition Teams
- OSB
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- Implementation of P3
- Provincial Transition Concept
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- Regional Reconstructión Operations Center
- Governance
- Communicating
- Rewards Program
- Working Concerns
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## Purpose

To conduct a back brief to the MNF-I and MNC-I Commanders regarding Task Force tin execution of MNC- OPORD 05-02

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## TASK ORGANIZATION



## TASK ORGANIZATION




## Intelligence Assessment

- Attacks are lower in AO LIBERTY since elections
- Threat leadership is degraded due to recent HVL/Rill/capture Op's
- Threat is comprised primarily of Former Regime Elements
- Foreign fighters transit through AO LABERTY in order to plan, stage, and conduct attacks elsewhere
- Political violence is most prevalentin areas where Sunni \& Shia or Kurd ethnic groups mix
- MOI forces have had success in reducing attacks in Samarra
- Those same MOI forces did not have as good success fighting well-trained and determined foreign fighters near Lake Tharthar
- Threat financiers, enablers, and foreign fighters are more mobile than Iraqi's who occasionally engage CF solely for monetary gain or retribution(opportunists)
- Attacks cycles occur in two-week intervals


## AO Liberty Intelligence Assumptions

- Expect increased attacks against coalition forces
- Ethnic tensions will increase along GreenLine
- Threat operations in urban areas will slowly reduce
- Threat sanctuaries in rural areas will increase
- Number of attacks (steady state) will continue at 10-15 per day
- Attacks will decrease in battle space assumed by ISF
- Threat attack effectiveness will increase
- Sunni's will become less inclined to support threat activities



278 RCT
(S/MCFI) Attack trend up since 24 MAR when average was 11.0 per day (S/MCFI) 13.42 attack average over last seven days; 13.26 over last 30 days (S/MCFI) Attacks between 116 BCT and 3 BCT remaining equal (S/MCFI) Trend of attacks against ISF dropped slightly to 17.34\%


100\%


24- 25- 26-27-28-29-30-31-1- 2- $3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-$ Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr
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23-29-Apwil 2005

1. 8 R $/ 3$ ВСT Seam HVI. AlF C2 \& Logistics (PIR 1,2) TUAV, Prophet UAV, JSTARS, EO/IR, 1.4c

## 2. Zaab Triangle

 HVI, AIF C2 \& Logistics PIR 1 2) TUAV Prophet 1.4c UAV, JSTARS, EO/IR, 1.4c
## 3. Lake Thar Thar

 HVI, AIF C2 \& Logistics (PIR 1, 2)JSTARS, UAV, EO/IR, 1.4c
4. Hamrin Mountains HVI, AIF C2 \& Logistics, (PIR 1, 2, 3)
JSTARS, UAV, 1.4 c EOIR, 1.4 c

## 5. Samarra

OP Baton Rouge, OP Green Lantern, HVI,
(PIR 1, 23 4)TUAV
Prophet, 1.4c
6. Kirkuk

HVI, Ethnic unrest
(PIR 1, 4, 5) TUAV, Prophet EO/IR, 1.4 c

## 7. IR/IZ Border

IR/IZ Border, Logistics (PIR 2)
1.4c EO/IR

Prepared by Task Force Liber


42 ${ }^{\text {nd }}$ |D Collection Emphasis:


## EAD ROLL-UP MAR-APR 05

## March 2005

Daily Average to Date: 5 hours


April 2005
Daily Average to Date: 2.0 hours


## Mission and Intent

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## Task Force Mission

TF CONDUCTS STABIUTY OPERATIONS WHILE TRANSITIONING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO COMPETENT IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND MINISTRIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONAMENT THAT PERMITS IRAQ SELF RELIANCE.

## Commander's Intent

## PURPOSE

WE MUST BUILD AND ENHANCETHE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF) CAPAB直ITY WHILE MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE INSURGENCY. AS THE ISF BECOME CAPABLEOF CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. WE WILA TRANSITION THE MAIN EFFORT FROM COALLTHON LEAD OPERATIONS TO ISF LEAD OPERATHONS TO NEUTRALIZE THE INSURGENCY. STABILITY OPERATIONS WILL BE SUSTAINED TOCONTINUE PROGRESS ALONG THE GOVERNANGE, ECONOMIC AND COMMUNICATING LINES OF OPERATIONS.

## Key Tasks

## KEY TASKS (1 of 3)

- ISF competence attained thru thorough and positive mentorship and training by MiTT Teams, designed to reinforce success and eliminate failure.
- With the ISF, conduct deliberate operations - based on predictive intelligence - to mass combat power to kill or capture the enemy.
- Employ the ISF at every opportunity and --
-Continue to develop provincial and local joint coordination centers
-Continue to improve the organization and equipping of the ISF
-Train, coach, and mentor the ISF on leader development and critical staff functions - operations, intelligence, communications, and training
-Establish ISF sustainment systems; include maintenance, transportation, supply, and medical functions
-Set the conditions for Iraqi control - battalions and brigades, capable of independent operations


## Key Tasks

## KEY TASKS (2 of 3)

- Continuously engage spheres of influence (SO1) at echelon with assigned themes and messages to deliver the division message to the Iraqi people.
- Conduct effects-based operations to synchronize lethal and non-lethal fires.
- Protect the force by securing and continuously improving the Division's FOBs and ISF key facilities with hardened sites and complex entry points with standoff to prevent suicide bombers and VBIEDs from breaching outer perimeters. Force protection enhanced by aggressive counter IED measures and training and reinforcement of safety measures and standards in all activities.
- Secure LOCs to ensure our freedom of maneuver thru thorough counter IED patrols, measures, and interdiction.
- Working in conjunction with and in support of the sovereign Iraqi government, improve basic services and the quality of life for the lraqi people, rehabilitate essential infrastructure, and create jobs.


## Key Tasks

## KEY TASKS ( 3 of 3)

- Protect critical Iraqi infrastructure from sabotage and destruction by applying ISR assets; leveraging JCCs, FPS, and the ISF; and conducting joint patrols.
- At all times, treat the Iraqi people with dignity and respect.
- Execute closure and turnover of Contingency Operating Sites (COS), Contingency Operating Locations (COL), and current Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to Iraqi government.
- Coordinate with IECI, other involved agencies, provincial and local governments and the SF to ensure planning of support, logistics and security-over watch for election periods
- Execute non-lethal effects support to COIN operations, legitimize the GO/ and change the public image of the AIF, thus denying their ability to influence the people of Iraq.
- Engage key leaders in the Sunni Arab Community to bring them into the political fold and Facilitate Sunni popular support for Iraqi government and the ISF.


## Commander's Intent

## END STATE

A SECURE ENVIRONMENT WITH IRAQI SECURITY FORCE'S CAPABLEOF CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, FUNCTIONING LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

## Keys To Success In the AO

- Increase capability of Iraqi Security Forces as we keep pressure on AIF
-Simultaneous application of partnership units and Military Transition Teams
-Develop capable military and police leaders. Gain Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior commitment to stabilize Iraqi Security Fofces
-Train and equip an effective police force
-Sustain support of the 1raqi people
-Separate extremists from the Iraqi people
-Establish partnership with provincial governments
-Resource economic development
-Effectively engage and involve local and provincial Sunni Leaders


## ISF and Transition Teams

## COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS


OPCON or TACON
Coordination
Attached
Advise \& Support
Iraqi Command Line
24 APR 2005

Page 24 redacted for the following reason:
(b)(3), (b)(6)



## $5^{\text {TH }}$ IA DIVISION

## Oil Security Battalions

## OIL SECURITY BATTALIONS



## OIL INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACKS and INCIDENTS

Since 14 Feb 05 there have been 6 incidents.
There have been numerous reported incidents on the oil pipelines in AO Liberty.

The majority of the reported incidents are: Burn off fires, Breaks in the lines not caused by attacks (Maintenance), criminal acts (stealing the oil out of the pipeline)

To Compare
JAN 055 Attacks
DEC 0417 Attacks
NOV 0423 Attacks.

Reported 18 Apr 05,
-116 BCT reports pipeline Fire LD 68707980

- 2 of the $16^{\prime \prime}$ Temp line cut
- Oil was shut off, resulting in fire and oil flowing into the river
- Have not received NOC damage report or estimate on repair. Oil rerouted to another line.

Reported 19 Apr 05,
-1 BCT reports oil fire at grid LD 78696852. Sent unit to investigate, NOT an Attack

Reported 21 Apr 05,

- (*1)116 BCT reports gas pipeline explosion at ME 09500 08300
- (*2) 1 BCT reports pipeline fire near Bayji refinery at LD 6800078000



## Special Forces Operations In Support of IA Units

(SINCE TOA: 14 FEB 05)

- 125 Operations
- 565 Detainees
-13 AIF KIA
- 1 AIF WIA


## ODA MiTT CONTRIBUTIONS

- Provided Cultural Awareness and FID classes
- Right/Left seat rides for IA TRNG
- Conducted combined ODA/MiTT\&TA Operations
- Provided POIs, translated classes, and training schedules
- Conducted foreign weaponsfamiliarization
- Advised MiTT on force protection
- Coordinated with MiTT for logistics flow to IA units
- Continue training of HA SCOUT platoons
- Assisted with IA METL assessment
- Provided INTELLCollection POI
- Facilitated introductions b/w MiTT and IA CDRs



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## THE POLICE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

- Draft FRAGO Directs a P3-P and P3-R
- P3-P Teams operate in a discrete manner withinthe Iraqi culture, with reduced presence and visibility while assisting the Iraqi police in performing their functional tasks by themselves
-Salah Ad Din P3P - Operational 1 May 05
-Kirkuk P3P - Operational NLT 15 May 05
-Diyala P3P - Operational Now
-Sulaymaniyah - Not Required per Operational Assessment
-Samarra P3R - Operational Now


## Samarra- P3-R

- P3-R does require embedding - We have been embedded in Samarra since early Feb 05.
- 264 IPs in position at Samarra with 376 currently in training and 550 more scheduled for training by late May
- Total of $1,200 \mathrm{lPs}$ trained and on the street in Samarra NLT 31 August on track for success


## Diyala P3-P Organization - 3 BCT



It is not anticipated or expected that the P3-P team reside at the IPS Provincial HQ.
It is not anticipated that the entire P3-P will be consumed $24 / 7$ with their P3 tasks or duties.


## Basing Consofidation Concept



# Regional Reconstruction Operations Center 

## Regional Reconstruction Operations Center

Provide coordinating facility to support the reconstruction effort within MND-NC (AO Liberty) AOR

- Facilitate and manage reconstruction effort and information
- Connect D/B contractors with ground level players (GRN/BCT/DG: PDTs)
- Integrate Infrastructure Process into MND-NC Information Operations
- Facilitate Security Coordination for D/Bs and contractors with AEGIS
- Facilitate among IRMO, PCO, Provincial DGs and Infrastructure DGs
- Coordinate information flow among NROC, Corps, DIV, RROC, \& BCTs
- Gain information on local contractor network for BCTs using GRN
- Provide a central, convenient, accessible facility for reconstruction operations andTinformation



## TE ${ }^{1.4 \mathrm{a}}$ OII Sector Pesults

Bayji Refinery
Refinery Training Room
QOL Projects; Clinic, Schools. Playground
Computer and Telephone communication system 70\% complete.
Facilitate \& Communicate More Effective Methods between
DGs and IRMO Senior Advisors
Kirkuk Refinery
Post Looting Clean-up Projects
Refinery and Pipeline RepairCompany Spare and Replacement Parts Road Paving in RefineryAreas

Oil Security
Replacement Parts for Iraq Pipeline Air Patrol Aircraft
Oil Infrastructure Working Groups - Coordinate Security
Supply Oil Sector with Ambulances, Fire Trucks, MHE, Safety Equipment.
Communications, Weapons \& Ammunition

Power Infrastructure: Bayji, Dibbis, Mulla, Kirkuk, Shaheed Shazed
Facilitated DFI acid tank project \& AC/DC couplings project Developed CERP funded repair on Waste Water Treatment Plant Developed CERP funded security wallfaround the housing area \& clinics Numerous QOL enhancements: Clinic, Schools \& Playgrounds Supply Power Sector with Ambülances, Fire Trucks, MHE, Safety Equipment.

Communications, Weapons \& Ammunition
Provided Potable Waterto both NRCC and Kirkuk Power Plant
Security Walls, towers, communications and weapons for plant security
All locations
Spare Parts for Power Generation equipment
$\square$

## Public Works Sector

 ResultsProgram Facilitation of:
Emergency Water and Sewer - Execute over \$4.2 (1.2M) million in water \& sewer Repair projects with FRAGO 620 funds.

Water Conservation Network Rehab - coordinate with PCO to maximize project participation in MND-NC and speed implementation of the projects.

PW-090 - Coordinate implementation and execution of PW-090 projects with the BCTs in each governorate.

PW-091 - Ensure that BCT coordinates with DGs to maximize capacity building efforts within their AOR and target PW-091 funds through Baghdad SOI engagements.

Establish O\&M training for all Water, Sewer and Water Conservation Network programs. Ensure that the BCTs coordinate with the DGs, and contracting and expedite all project phases and maximize the $\$$ allocated to the MND-NC AO.

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Transportation Sector Results

- Facilitate Al-Fat’ah Highway Bridge in Bayji Reconstruction
- As-Sharqat Highway Bridge Reconstruction
- Buhriz Bridge Construction
- Engage SOls to Facilitate the Repair ánd Improvement of Al-Fat'ah Rail Bridge
- Following thru on the completion of Village Roads in Salah AI Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala
- Identify sources of Quality Gravel throughout the AOR
- Identify sources for quality Rail Road Ballast throughout the AOR
- Facilitated the renovation of 21 Passenger Rail Road Stations
- Secured from IRR Rlans for the Bayji and Kirkuk Commercial RR Terminals


## BH\&E Sector Results

Facilitating Meetings among DG of Education, Salah Ah Din Providence and Kirkuk Provinces, OTI, and BCTs to fill schools with school furnishing and equipment.

Facilitated Meetings with Director NOCHospital, Kirkuk, to facilitate medical equipment purchases.

Facilitated meeting with Salah Ab Din DG Health on construction quality of a Oxygen Plant

Cleaning up previous IID DFI Health and Education projects

Governance and Communicating

## Governance Transition Actions

- Provincial Councils
-Kirkuk
- Council is deadlocked
- Article 58 issues
-As Sulymaniyah
- New Governor
-Salah Ad Din
- Governor reelected
- Rejected Regional Govt.
-Diyala
- New Governor
- Local Governance
-TF monitor City Councils
-CERP project coordination
-Basic services assistance
-Security assistance
- Key Initiatives
-Provincial involvement in CERP project planning
-DG Coordination
-BCTs monitor provincial governments
-One-to-one SOI mentoring on governance issues.
- Friction Points
-Kirkuk: Ethnic tensions
-Local Intimidation
-IPCC/IDPs
-Electricity/water availabilty


## INFORMATION OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES:

1. INCREASE REPORTING OF AIF
2. INCREASE IRAQI POPULACE CONFIDENCE IN AND SUPPORT FOR ISF
3. SEPARATE AIF FROM THE POPULACE
4. INCREASE POPULACE SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
5. INCREASE POPULACE CONFIDENCE IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS THEMES

1. TERRORISTS, FOREIGN FIGHTERS, FORMER REGIME ELEMENTS, AND CRIMINALS ARE HURTING THE GOOD PEOPLE OF IRAQ, THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AND COALITION FORCES. THEY ARE THE COMMON ENEMY
2. THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES ARE STEADFAST AND RESOLUTE IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST THE ENEMY. THEY CONTINUE TO BE BETTER ARMED, BETTER TRAINED, AND BETTER EQUIPPED. THEY WILL NOI BACK DOWN FROM PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE TO LIVE FREE OF FEAR AND INTIMIDATION.
3. COALITION FORCES WORK IN PARTNERSHIP WITH LOCAL IRAQI BUSINESSES TO EXPAND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE IRAQIPEOPLE.
4. COALITION FORCES WILL WORK WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES TO ENSURE THAT ACCESS TO WATER, ELECTRICITY, AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES CONTINUES TO IMPROVE IN NORTH-CENTRAL IRAQ. THIS ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES RELIES ON THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.


## MEDIA CAPABILITIES

KIRKUK MEDIA CENTER (IMN) DIYALA MEDIA CENTER (IMN) TIKRIT MEDIA CENTER KURDSAT
TURKSAT
26 CF SUPPORTED
NEWSPAPERS
IN MND-NC

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## COMMUNICATING

| (b)(6) |
| :---: |
|  |
|  |
|  |

17 APRIL 2005
CITIZENS OF KHAN BANI SA'AD ORGANIZED A DEMONSTRATION TO PROTEST RECENT ACTS OF VIOLENCE.

(b)(3), (b)(6)


Waiting for the director to say, Go

17 APRIL 2005
KIRKUK POLICE "COPS SHOW" PUBLICIZES JCC PHONE NUMBERS AND REQUESTS INFORMATION ON FIVE UNSOLVED CRIMES.

## Rewards Program

## Rewards for Information

Unit
$1^{\text {st }} \mathrm{BDE}$
$3^{\text {rd }}$ BDE
116 BCT
278 RCT
Reserve
TOTAL (since 1 Feb 05)
*Trailblazer units willbe issued Micro-rewards next week
Additional funds should be available in July

## Working Issues

## Working Issues

- Who will be the custodians of FOB Danger and Dagger upon base closure?
- Will there be commercial COMS tosupport the $101^{\text {st }}$ and the MiTTs?
- Can we add a U.S. BN to Caldwell as TF , to consolidates?
-What is the municipal JCO funding plan? Require assistance energizing the Iraqi governments funding of these successful programs.
- What is the structure of the $\quad$ Task Force? (\# of BDEs)


## Red indicates a time sensitive issue

Blue indicates an issue that will impact OIF 05-07 Sourcing

## Working Issues

## IA

-Where will the $4^{\text {th }}$ IA $H Q$ be located?

- Will a standardized policy for Iraqi wark and leave schedule be forthcoming?
- Will MOD synchronize the MTOE difference between former ING and IA units (i.e. vehicles, radios, personnel)?
- What is the CMD relationship between $32^{\text {nd }}$ BDE and the 5th IA?
- IA manning is Green, most units at or over strength; however, pay problems are common, is there a plan to address this issue?
- Awaiting MNF-h approval to streamline the release /disclosure of intelligence to the ISF?


## Working Issues

## ISF cont.

- IA equipping is Orange, there is a Reed for weapons, vehicles, radios andbody armor, with regard to Iraqi logistics and sustainment:
-What do we provide?
-What do the BSUs provide?
-Will the IA up-armor program expand?
- IA sustainment is Red. Guidance is limited. What is the plan for sourcing and what are the levels of Iraqi funding particularly with regard to maintenance?


## Working Issues

## OSB

- Majority of the $11^{\text {th }}$ OSB AO is outside the $30^{\text {in }}$ BDE sector. Request MOD consider moving the $11^{\text {th }}$ OSB from C2 of the $30^{\text {th }}$ IA BDE and under the C2 of a BDE in the vicinity of Baghdad.
- What is the basic equipping plan for things such as uniforms for the OSBs; lack of uniforms creates potential for Blue on Green incident?
- Is there a plan to issue identification and weapons cards to the OSBs?
- Is there a plan to address the adequacy of the oil line checkpoints?
- How will the OSBS communicate with other ISF units and CF?


## Working Issues

## OSB cont.

- Is there a plan to address the inadequacies of the meal contract for OSBs?
- How will OSBs be transported for patrols?
- ROE for OSBs is undefined.
- Is there a plan to develop an intermediate C2 node for the OSBs to interact with the IA BDE? (Span too wide for $B D E$ to C 2 all eight BNs )
- The $4^{\text {th, }} 5^{\text {th }}$ and $7^{\text {th }}$ BNs of the $2^{\text {nd }}$ IA DIV are in $4^{\text {th }}$ IA DIV battle space, request they be placed under C2 ofthe $30^{\text {th }}$ BDE, $4^{\text {th }}$ IA DIV.


## Working Issues

## IPS

- What is the equipping plan for basic policing-items such as vehicles, weapons, and body armor?
- With current school allocations it will be over eighteen months before the IPS are 100\% trained.
- What is the plan for maintenance and replacement of items previously issued and what are the levels of Iraqi funding particularly with regard to maintenance?



## BACKUP SLIDES







## OPERATIONAL TIMELINE



## Threat Most Likely COA

Former Regime Elements and the cells that they enable and provide financing to conduct the majority of attacks in AO LIBERTY. Approximately half of these attacks will occur in Salah ah Din Province, Approximately a quarter of all attacks will target Iraqi Security Forces. Average weekly attacks will remain around eighty attacks per week (steady state). Threat forces will conduct IED, indirect, direct fire, and complex attacks against Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces in order to harass, interdict and disrupt operations and cause as many casualties as possible. They will also seek membership in the Iraqi Security Forces in order to provide early warning to threat forces and gain information for future operational planning. Attacks against infrastructure will be conducted in order to cause or perpetuate general dissatisfaction with the local and national governments' ability to improve fundamental services. Threat forces will continue attacks and acts of intimidation against Iraqi government officials in_order to remove and influence officials working against threat forces. Rural areas along unit seams with low Coalition Force presence will increasingly be used by threat forces for sanctuaries from which operations are conducted.

## Threat Most Dangerous COA

Former Regime Elements unify cells that they finance and enable in order to conduct synchrofized operations against key infrastructure, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. These operations embolden other Anti-Iraqi Forces to intensify their operations resulting in widespread instability that overwhelms coalition forces, paralyzes the Iraqi government, and demoralizes Iraqi Security Forces. They concurrently leverage ethnic, religious and nationalist ties to gain increasing populace support and incite further violence.



## Hamrin Mountain Overview



DIIR-3ID-256BCT-621-05-0042: 1.4b INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CONDUCTS TRAINING IN CAMPS WITHIN IRAQ AND 1.4b

TD 1.4a 18355-05/ TD-1.4a/15108-05: SERIES OF CAVES LOCATED IN THE DRAWS OF THE NORTHWEST PORTION OF THE HAMRIN MOUNTAINS UTILIZED BY QJBR

TD 1.4a 20725-05: MOVEMENTS AND MEETING LOCATIONS OF ABU MUS'AB AL-ZARQAWI

| 1.4 c |
| :---: |
| 38 S LD 9428513897, LD 84154/33775, | MD 34778/28709 IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI ASSOCIATES AND LOCATIONS.

SPOT OBIZ-DET-K-071-05/ SPOT OBIZ-DET-K-071-05: LOCATION OF 1BCT HVT\#3 (b)(6) AND PLANNED INSURGENT MTG. 38SMD3642832289

7 APR 05 JSTARS REPORT: REPORTED MILLING AREA TF 1.4a N REPORT: POSSIBLE DIGGING/BURIEL SITE

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## Potential Samarra QJBR Links

## HVI <br> FUTURE LEADERSHIP



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## Concept of the Operation

## Concept of the Operation (1of 3)

Iraqi Security Forces with embedded transition teams (ME) conduct counter insurgency operations to the extent of their capabilities. ISF is supported byeCF in order to neutralize the AIF. Simultaneously TF ite mentors Iraqi forces at the Battalion level and above while maintaining partnering at the Company leve/in order to develop Iraqi Army (IA) capabilities. As the IA gain capability, battle space will be transitioned to Iraqi control. TF continue to support MiTTS through logistics, F, fires, and medevac from contingency operating sites (COS) at FOBs Warrior, Speicher, Warhorse, and Anaconda. TF continues to provide oversight of the OSB, IPS and DBE as required in order to secure critical infrastructure, stabilize and secure urban areas, and control borders.

## Concept of the Operation ${ }_{(20 f 3)}$

As TF 1.a $^{\text {ta }}$ transitions battle space to ca able ISF, FOBs will be transferred to Iraqi control and TF 1 ta will be consolidated. The division FOB Relocation Iraqi Transition Team (FRITT) will assist units in the management of FOB transition. As Sulaymaniyah province will be transitioned on or about June 2005. Diyala province will transition on or about November 2005 as will Kirkuk (At Tameen) province. Salah ad Din will remain under coalition control until approximately June 2006. Coalition forces will reduce their footprint by transitioning battle space to Iraqi control and consolidating FOBs.

## Concept of the Operation ${ }_{(30 \mathrm{f} 3)}$

TF $\quad$ te will continue to support the Iraqi transitional government by assisting the ISF in setting the conditions for a successful election. TF willengage the Independent Election Comm ss on orrraq (IECI) and the ISF in AO Liberty to ensure they are prepared and equipped for all phases of the election process. MSCs must be prepared to assist if requested. Support may come in the form of assistance in planging for distribution of registration and ballot materials, site security planning, and appropriate life support All MSCs must be prepared to act and initiate actions as required including those the IECI or ISF are unable to accomplish. Direct action will only be initiated after requested by the IECI in writing and approved or directed by higher. Maintaining support for the ISF and the Iraqi government will require TF [,the to work closely with the $101^{\text {st }}$ ABN (AASLT) DIV durng -- IOT maintain momentum and seamlessly transition the force.

## Key Operational Concepts by Phase



|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { PHASE I } \\ \text { APR } 05-J U N 05 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { PHASE II } \\ \text { JUL } 05-\text { SEP } 05 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { PHASE III } \\ & \text { OCT } 05-\text { AN } 06 \end{aligned}$ | PHASE IVA FEB $06-J U N 06$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ISF <br> Capabilities | BN Level OPS | BDE Level OPS | DIV, Revel COIN | DIV Level Nat'l Sec Ops |
| AIF <br> Capabilities | Key Cities Secured | Domestic Order in ISF Controlled Provinces | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Domestic Order } \\ & \text { Maintained in } \\ & \text { CAT A \& B Provinces } \end{aligned}$ | AIF Neutralized |
| Transition Teams | Established and Operational | Fully Operational | Fully Operational | Reduce/ Tailor Transition Teams |
| Basing | Turn Over Stone, Dibbis, Crazyhorse |  | Turn Over TBD | All but Anaconda |
| Elections | Planning | Registration | Referendum \& Election Preparation | Support Public Discussion |
| Effects | Capable ISF in all Provinces | Capable ISF and GOI in B\& C Provinces | Capable ISF and GOI in C Provinces | Functioning GOI Growing Economy |

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PSD: INTERNAL

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## BN MiTTs



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Prepared by Task Force 1.4 a G-3 Plans


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## BN MiTTs



| BDE TM LDR |
| :--- |
| BDE NCOIC |
| BDE AST TM LDR |
| BDE OPS OFFICER |
| BDE AST OPSOFF |
| BDE S5/EN/ |
| CONTRACTING |
| BDE S1 NCO |
| BDE S4 OIC |
| BDE COMMO NCO |
| BDEMED NCO |
| INTEL OFFICER |
| INTEL NCO |
| FIRE SUP OFF |
| FSNCO |
| BDE MITT LNO |
| CAT2 INTERP |
| PSD: (b), (b)(6) |

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| :---: |
| G-3 Plans |

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## 278 ${ }^{\text {th }}$ BCT

## BCT MiTT TEAM SUPPORT

## 18 Personnel

BDE NCOIC SSG
BDE S1 NCO SGT
BDE S4 NCO SSG
COMMO NCO SSG

GUNNER E1-E4

| TM LDR | MAJ |
| :--- | :--- |
| FSO | 2 LT |
| GUNNER | E1-4 |
| INTEL ANAL | SPC |


| AST TM LDR | CPT |
| :--- | :---: |
| S2 OFFICER | 1 LT |
| FSNCO | SSG |
| MED NCO | SSG |



| OPS OFF | CPT | IN |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| S5/EN | CPT | ENG |
| INTEL NCO | SSG | $96 B$ |
| CONTRACTNCO | SSG | IMITT |
| GUNNER | E1-4 | IMAT |


|  |  |  | M1114 |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| CREW: 4 |  |  |  |
| WEAPON: M249 |  |  |  |
| RADIO: AN/VRC-90F |  |  |  |

M1114
CREW: 4
WEAPON: M249
RADIO: AN/VRC-90F

M1114
CREW: 5
WEAPON: M240B
RADIO: AN/VRC-90F


PSD SEC MTR SECTION (6 PAX)


## BCT ADDITIONS

TAC SAT SAT PHONE
CLS
FBCB2 HF RADIO

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## BN MiTT TEAM SUPPORT

## 14 Personnel



| AST TM LDR | O3 | CBT ARMS |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| BN OPS NCO | E6 | CBT ARMS |
| BN S4 NCO. | E5-6 | $92 Y$ |
| BN S1 NCO | E5-6 | 42 A (GUNNER) |
| DRV | E1-4 | IMAT. |

CREW: 4
WEAPON: PERSONNEL
RADIO: ANNRC-90F

| TM LDR | 04 | CBT ARMS |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| AST TM LDR | 03 | IMAT. |
| BN OPS NCO | E6 | IMAT |
| COMMO NCO | E4-5 | 31U (DRIVER) |


|  |  |  |  | M1114 |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CREW: 5 |  |  |  |  |
| WEAPON: M240 |  |  |  |  |
| RADIO: ANNRC-90F |  |  |  |  |



PSD PLT


RANK
RANK RANK RANK


## BCT ADDITIONS <br> TAC SAT <br> SAT PHONE <br> CLS <br> FBCB2 <br> HF RADIO

PSD ADDITIONAL DUTIES

TRAINING
SECURITY
REPORTING
DURING OPS

## IA Support

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## IA Life Support Funding Flow



## IA Non-Life Support Funding Flow

FINISH
7 Unit
Receives
Service/
Items
 Awards Contract

START


Uniforms Buildings Construction

Furniture Office Equipment


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## OIL SECURITY BATTALIONS


$1 \times$ Patrol Co
$3 \times$ Static Co
$1 \times$ Patrol Co
$3 \times$ Static Co
$1 \times$ Patrol Co
$3 \times$ Static Co

Equipment currently being issued

- $750 \times 3$ BN AK-47s
-12 X 3 BKCs
- $2 \times 3$ RPKs
-1000 X 3 Uniforms
-1000 X 3 Boots
-1000 X 3 Hats
-1000 X 3 Long Underwear
-120,000k AK rounds
$\cdot 7,000$ BKC rounds
$\cdot 2,500 \times 3$ blankets
-200 X 3 Cushions
- $500 \times 3$ Winter Coats


1.4a G-3 Plans

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## Current Issues:

Unity of command at Bayji Bridge
BN HQ not well established / force protection
No Identification cards as of yet
No weapons cards
Oil line checkpoints are not adequate Communication
Inadequate meal contract
Mobility for patrols
Still allowing civilians near pipeline
Need physical barriers around valves

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

Information on the Oil Pipeline BNs from $\mathrm{S} \longrightarrow \quad \mathrm{MOD}:$
a. BNs 1, 2, 3 are part of the $31^{\text {st }} \mathrm{ING} B D E$, and their sector is from Kirkuk to AI Fatha. The bridge at Al Fatha is outside of their AO.
b. BNs $4,5,6,7,14$ and 15 's seetor is from the north of Bayji to Rabeeh. These BNs report to the $2^{\text {nd }}$ ING Division HQ in Mosul for C2.
c. BNs $8,9,10,11$ sector is from Baghdad to Bayji. These BNs report to 30 ING BDE in Tikrit for C2.
d. BNs 12, 13 sector is from Baghdad to Anjanah. These BNs report to 32 ING BDE for C2.
e. BNs 16, 17 sector is from Baghdad to Karbala. These BNs are not formed yet, but will report to the Baghdad ING Division.
f. Currently there are 10 BNs on the ground. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Each BN has 44 officers and 1000 Soldiers authorized. BN 11 is authorized one extra rifle company for a total of $44 / 1200$. None of these BNs are at full strength.

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## P3P / P3R Subjective Overview

Currently operating an Embedded Police Partnership Program, Reconstitution (P3-R) in Samarra
264 IPs in position with 376 in training and 550 scheduled for training in May
Total of 1,200 trained NLT August Phase I
(P3-P) in Diyala
3 BCT took initiative and developed P3-P Team based off draft proposal
Team stood up 1APR in Diyala. Establishing a P3-P Team in Salah AI Din NLT 29APR
Phase II
( P3-P) Team in Kirkuk Province NLT 27MAY 116 BCT establishing program now requirements now As Sulaymaniyah is scheduled to be returned to Iraqi regional control on 1JUN Due to As Sulaymaniyah's stability it is determined that a P3-P is not required
Capable of meeting
Directed timeline
Operational

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## Samarra P3-R Organization - 1 BCT




It is not anticipated or expected that the P3-P team reside at the IPS Provincial HQ.
It is not anticipated that the entire P3-P will be consumed $24 / 7$ with their P3 tasks or duties.

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## Organization - TF



3 BCT


## Support Following Battle Space Transition

## ARMY AIR SUPPORT CONCEPT




## MITTS COMMS AFTER BASE CONSOLIDATION



# Regional Reconstruction Operations Center 

## OIL

Purpose: Primary facilitator of all Oil Sector Projects \& improvements in Task Force
An AO

Method: Coordinates with SOls aft the Regional (NOC) level and at the individual Plants to determine requirements in the Oil
Sector that will enhance orprovide ancillary support to existing IRRF projects. Coordinates with IRMO and PCO Oil Sector to resolve issues in infrastructure and determines alternative funding sources. Uses Task Force $\quad$ ita CERP for projects that can not be fuffilled by PCO.

## POWER

## Sector: Power

Purpose: Primary facilitator of all Power sector projects \& improvements in Task Force ${ }_{14}$ AOO. Coordinates with SOls at the local, regional and national levels.

Method: Coordinates with SOIs at the Regional (Northern Region) level and at the individual Plants to determine requirements in the Power Sector that will enhance or provide ancillary support to existing IRRF projects. Coordinates with IRMO and PCO Power Sector to resolve issues in infrastructure and determines alternative funding sources. Uses Task Force ${ }_{1, \text { as }}$ CERP for projects that can not be fulfilled by PCO.

## PUBLIC WORKS

## Sector: Public Works



Purpose: Primary facilitator of all Water and Sewer projects \& improvements in Task Force taO Coordinates with SOIs at the BCT, regional and national levels.

Method: Coordinates with SOIs at the Provincial level with BCT representatives to determine Potable Water requirements. Coordinates with IRMO andPCO Water on Water and Sewer Programs, serves as a conduit of information to BCTs concerning these new programs, Assists BCTs in identifying Potable water and sewer requirements that meet the various programs criteria. Serves as the "Go.Between" to resolve issues in Water and Sewer infrastructure and determines alternative funding sources. Uses Task Force $\quad$ CERP for projects that can not be fulfilled by PCO.

## TRANSPORTATION

Sector: Transportation
(b)(3), (b)(6)

441 CA Bn
Purpose: Primary facilitator of all Transportation sector projects (Rail, Critical Bridges \& Roads) \& Task Force $\quad$ AO.

Method: Coordinates with SOls at the BCT, Provincial and National levels to resolve conflicts among the contractors, D/Bs, PCO, IRMO and occasionally local leadership. Uses Division assets to recon projects and ensure projects are within acceptable standards. Assists contractors in identifying sources of materials. Influences leaders at IRMO to push certain projects if no movement has occurred.

## HEALTH AND EDUCATION

Sector: Buildings Health and Education Program Manager


Purpose: Primary construction managen/facilitator of all Buildings Health and Education Projects \& Improvements in Task Force $\quad 1$ AO AO.
Method: Coordinates with SOIs at the BCT, Provincial, and Infrastructure Component to resolve conflicts among the Contractors and various customers. Works with OTI to fill Recently renovated schools with equipment and supplies. Uses Task Force ${ }_{1 \text { ta }}$ CERP for projects that can not be fulfilled by OTI/USAID. Coordinates with Infrastructure Component DGs to determine Clinic and Schools requirements on the Infrastructure LSAs. Coordinates with PCO to fund requirements. Uses 42d ID CERP for projects that can not be fulfilled by PCO.

## Governance Transition Concept

Iraq gained national sovereignty on 28 June 2004. As such, CF participation in local, provincial and national governance is limited to monitoring and reporting.
-Phase I \& II - FOB consolidation - the monitoring and reporting of local governments will slowly decrease and ultimately end.
-Phase III - CF consolidates on Contingency Operating Locations (COL). The monitoring and reporting of governance will shift it's primary focus to the Provincial Level.
-Phase IV - CF consolidates on Contingency Operating Bases (COB). The monitoring and reporting of governance will shift to regional governments and areas, i.e. the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)\& Sunni heartland.
-Department of State (DOS) \& PCO - Not all personnel will relocate. The Regional Embassy Offices (REO) are independent.
-Tikrit - SET and PCO to Speicher.
-Baquba - Phases I\&II - SET, PCO, Engineers, CA at CMOC. Phase III - DP to move/close/remain in place.
-Kirkuk - currently a Regional Embassy Office. Patriot Base will remain during Phases I-III. Phase IV is a decision point to move/close/remain in place.


[^0]:    Prepared by Task Force 1.4 a G-3 Plans

[^1]:    Prepared by Task Force 1.4a G-3 Plans

[^2]:    Prepared by Task Force 1.4a G-3 Plans

